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RF: There are signs that the economy may have turned
the corner. Looking back at the financial crisis from our
current vantage point, what are the major lessons that
policymakers should take from it?
Kaufman: There are a number of important lessons. First,
capital matters for banks. It is not everything, but with too
little, banks are likely to freeze up and fail, and contagion is
likely if losses at one bank wipe out capital at other banks in
chainlike fashion. Capital should be the primary concern for
any prudential regulatory system.
Second, asset price bubbles are dangerous to the economy
and the longer they last, the more dangerous they become.
More attention needs to be devoted to them, including
whether to include asset prices in the measure of prices 
targeted by policymakers and how to protect financial 
institutions against their bursting. In addition, the implica-
tions of low interest rates on asset prices as well as on goods 
and services prices and employment need to be carefully 
studied. 
Third, planning and preparation for tail events, such as
financial crises and insolvency of large financial institutions,
are very important. These plans should be made public so
everyone understands the ground rules. Part of the reason
for the inconsistency in public policies attacking the current
crisis was the lack of advance planning for the measures that
were announced publicly. The inconsistency in policy
increased uncertainty in the market and intensified the tur-
moil. Strategies adopted should be consistent through time
so that participants can make plans. Inconsistent actions
lead to inconsistent and unpredictable responses. 






















































Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s conver-
sation with George Kaufman. For the full interview, go to our 
Web site: www.richmondfed.org/publications.
It will be many years before economists have a compre-
hensive understanding of what caused the financial
crisis. But policymakers need to act in real time to help
resolve such crises and to take steps that will improve
the overall stability of the financial system. 
George Kaufman has spent his professional career, 
now ranging over five decades, studying the financial
industry. His work has spanned both “theory” and
“practice” — or, perhaps more precisely, has connected
the two. He has brought academic rigor to bear on
important policy questions. Like all economists who
endeavor to influence policy, some of his research find-
ings have been heeded while others have not. Indeed,
Kaufman has long maintained that the financial system
would benefit from greater market discipline. But the
lack of such discipline arguably was one of the major
factors contributing to the onset and severity of the 
crisis — and remains an issue that policymakers must
confront in the wake of the safety net protection that
was recently extended to numerous institutions.
Kaufman worked as an economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago from 1959 to 1970. He then
spent the following decade at the University of Oregon,
before returning to Chicago in 1981 to teach at Loyola
University and to direct its Center for Financial and
Policy Studies. Kaufman is the founding editor of the
Journal of Financial Stability, serves as co-chair of the
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, and is a con-
sultant at the Chicago Fed.  
Aaron Steelman interviewed Kaufman in December
2009.RF: In March of 2008, you remarked, “Everybody
knows Santayana’s saying that those who fail to study
history are condemned to repeat it. Those who study
financial history are condemned to first agonize over
the patterns they recognize and then repeat it anyway.”
Do you think that will be true this time as well?
Kaufman: Yes, very much so. Many of the policy actions
taken were the same or similar to the actions in past crises —
say, in the S&Lcrisis of the 1980s — but even larger in scale.
They focused on bailouts and forbearance. In part, this
reflects a combination of being caught by surprise, lack of
preparation, need to act quickly (frequently over a weekend)
with no grand plans, extreme risk aversion, and political
pressure. Thus, moral hazard is likely to be stronger coming
out of the crisis than going in. 
RF: That leads me to a broader issue, one that you may
have not directly addressed, but I imagine you have con-
sidered: Why is there often such a large gap between the
recommendations of academic economists and the
actions of the policymakers they seek to influence or
may even directly advise? And in which areas do you
think economists have been most successful in bridging
that gap?
Kaufman: There is a gap because policymakers are in the
hot seat and under pressure from various constituencies,
many of whom focus on the short run, while academic 
economists focus primarily on long-run efficient solutions.
The academic economists would act more like the policy-
makers and vice versa if there was a role reversal.
Policymakers are likely to respond more favorably to advice
from academics and other outsiders when the leading 
constituencies are out of favor or discredited. For example, 
the prompt corrective action and least-cost resolution 
provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act, which were designed with the help of 
academics, were enacted in 1991 over the objection of most
bankers and bank regulators, whose credibility had been 
tarnished by the S&L crisis. In contrast, in the current finan-
cial crisis, while bankers may have had their credibility
tarnished again, regulators appear to have maintained theirs
better and academic proposals have not advanced as far. But,
as Keynes concluded: 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers,
both when they are right and when they are wrong,
are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world is ruled  by little else. Practical men,
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear 
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some
academic scribbler of a few years back. 
RF: Given the expansion — both implicit and explicit —
of the federal financial safety net during the crisis, 
what practical steps could policymakers take to restore
meaningful market discipline?
Kaufman: Very few in the short run. Based on the experi-
ence of the last two years, most market participants 
believe that by exerting sufficient pressure on the govern-
ment and regulators they can receive a wide range of
guarantees on their deposits and other creditor securities.
Only actual losses through time will dissuade them. But 
losses, if any, are likely to be permitted by regulators only in
noncrisis periods. To build their credibility, regulators 
must be willing to let market discipline operate and permit
losses  on all de-jure uninsured deposits and other liabilities
over a number of years. In a crisis atmosphere, such as
recently, market discipline is again likely to be an early 
casualty. Thus, the long-run cost of recent bailout programs
in terms of weakening market discipline through time is 
very high. 
RF: In a perfect world, to what extent would you limit
the safety net? For instance, is there good reason to 
do more than simply guarantee small depositors at 
commercial banks?
Kaufman: No. 
RF: Many in the public — and a nontrivial number of
economists — believe that the financial system is inher-
ently fragile and requires significant regulation to
reduce systemic risk. How would you respond?
Kaufman: There is a difference between fragility and 
breakage. For example, fine wine glasses are more fragile
than ordinary drinking glasses, yet, at least in my household,
the ordinary drinking glasses break more frequently. That is
because they are handled more carelessly. The same is true
with banking. Before the introduction of the Fed, banks
operated with lower capital ratios than nonbanks, as they 
do now, yet their failure rate was no higher on average.
However, banks did fail more in clusters, as their high 
leverage makes them more sensitive to tail shocks that affect
them in common. But, in the absence of a government 
safety net, bankers are likely to handle their banks with care,
taking only as much ex-ante risk as is consistent with their
capital. Of course, ex-post risk may exceed ex-ante risk, 
particularly in a crisis. Then the central bank needs to 
provide liquidity, but not to protect creditors of insolvent
banks. Such a strategy is only self-defeating. The greater the
protection provided, the greater the risks bankers take, and
the greater the number and cost of failures. 
RF: Some blame the financial crisis on financial innova-
tions that went astray. What are your thoughts?
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Kaufman: I believe that innovation both in methodology
and application have been and continue to be an integral
part of finance and that, on the whole, both finance and the
macroeconomy have benefited from it. Numerous empirical
studies have shown convincingly that political jurisdictions
which have deeper and more sophisticated financial sectors
have experienced faster economic growth. But there are
costs as well as benefits to having large financial sectors.
When things go right in the financial sectors, the economy
benefits. But when things go wrong, they have adverse 
consequences for the economy — and the larger the finan-
cial sector, the more serious the damage. 
The rapid growth in financial institutions and markets in
the United States in recent years has in part been driven 
by innovation. Because finance basically involves informa-
tion collection, storage, processing, and distribution,
innovations in computer and telecommunication tech-
nology have shortened the time necessary to perform these
functions and reduced their costs. This has encouraged
innovations that permit financial products to be tailored
more to the unique needs of existing or potential partici-
pants in financial markets. 
Innovations of any kind are risky and their lasting value
should be judged on the basis of their benefits relative to
costs. Some may not work as advertised and possibly do con-
siderable damage at high cost. Others may work but require
a long learning curve, during which time the costs exceed 
the benefits but are then reversed. And some may generate
benefits immediately. 
Many of the world’s greatest innovations required
lengthy learning curves to gain the full benefit. Early appli-
cation of the steam engine to railroads and ships resulted in
numerous explosions that killed or maimed users. And the
bigger the engine, the more deadly the accidents. Likewise,
early flying machines, including those that proceeded or
immediately followed the Wright Brothers, had a poor 
safety record and the higher the flight, the greater the 
severity of injury. Those that did not fly high did not produce
many injuries but they achieved little. 
The great advances in computer technology and tele-
communications in recent years have encouraged the
development of increasingly complex financial instruments.
Some of the innovations were so complex that they outran
the ability of both users and regulators to understand them
quickly. Thus, they had the potential for misuse with result-
ing serious damage. And the potential was realized.
An example is subprime residential mortgages. They
were designed to increase the flow of mortgage credit to
households that previously had not qualified for regular
mortgages because their credit rating and income were too
low. Thus, they were not eligible for homeownership. But, as
we now know, these mortgages were often misused to pro-
vide credit to those who could not afford them or did not
fully understand the conditions of the mortgage contract.
So, the default rate was unexpectedly high and subprime
mortgages have almost disappeared from the market. But
undoubtedly some low-income or credit-challenged house-
holds are using them successfully to purchase homes 
that they otherwise would not have been able to.
Nevertheless, it appears that, as of now, the costs have
exceeded the benefits.
I believe that in the not-too-distant future subprime
mortgages will reappear, but probably under a different
name and with an improved design. I am reminded of the
development of corporate junk bonds in the 1980s. They
were the subprime mortgages of their day. Junk bonds were
subprime corporate bonds that opened capital markets to
risky, often younger, corporations. And like subprime mort-
gages, they were misused at first. Judging their risks required
different analytics than for regular corporate bonds and they
experienced high default rates. Indeed, they resulted in the
bankruptcy of the investment banking firm Drexel
Burnham Lambert, which was the largest underwriter of
junk bonds, and in a prison term for the firm’s Michael
Milken, who was the primary champion of junk bonds. As
Drexel was also the largest market maker for junk bonds, its
demise almost shut down the junk bond market. But the
need for bonds to service this underserved part of the corpo-
rate market remained, and investors learned in time to
understand them and use them correctly. Junk, or more tact-
fully, high-yield, bonds made a comeback and now comprise
some 20 percent of the corporate bond market and no
longer raise eyebrows. 
The feeling that financial innovation has gone too far is
quite widespread. Recently, for instance, former Fed
Chairman Paul Volcker expressed concern over the value
added by such innovation. I admire and respect Paul Volcker
greatly. He was one of the world’s great central bankers and
is now one of the truly wise men in finance. But here I
believe he may overstate the negative. The innovated 
securities did not cause the crisis but magnified its impact.
The basic cause was the bubble in home prices, which pro-
vided the base for many of these securities. Would we have
been better off if we had banned the steam engine and the
airplane because of the high casualty rate at their births? I
don’t think so. But one can come back and argue that the
aggregate cost of the financial accident was much higher.
And they may be right, but the cost of correcting the prob-
lem I believe is also far less. And this includes not only
subprime mortgages but also the more complex securitized
products like collateralized debt obligations and credit
default swaps. If used correctly, they show great promise in
adding to our future economic welfare by diversifying risk
over a broader base of investors and thus increasing the flow
of funds and investment. I believe that in time market par-
ticipants will climb up the learning curve and at least
partially resuscitate the less complex of these innovations
and use them more safely. But it will take time.
RF: How would you define an asset price bubble? And
when we believe that one is emerging or has emerged,
what, if anything, should policymakers do in response?Kaufman: Asset price bubbles are
difficult to identify. One person’s
bubble is another person’s funda-
mental value. As I noted in my
answer to the first question, the best
protection against damage from the
bursting of a bubble is to fortify the
financial system, which, as also noted
above, is highly leveraged and fragile
to tail shocks. Higher capital ratios
would cushion and absorb the
adverse impact and reduce systemic
risk. Alternative policies of incorpo-
rating asset prices in the inflation
target or leaning against the bubble
are insufficiently researched to date. 
RF: What do you think of the
recent rules aimed at limiting
executive compensation?
Kaufman: I understand the public
backlash against the outlandish
bonuses paid by some financial institutions, but trying to
stop the practice is both costly and likely to be unsuccessful.
In a competitive environment, limiting compensation in
some firms or industries is likely to be costly to those firms
or industries as their best talents are bid away. Ironically, this
may hurt the government if the affected firms are those that
the government aided and received ownership in. Moreover,
compensation regulation is relatively easy to circumvent.
For example, in response to a similar public outcry against
high executive compensation in the mid-1990s, the govern-
ment imposed a ceiling of $1 million on the deduction that
corporations could take on cash compensation by their top
executives. The response was an increase in compensation in
stock options rather than cash, leading to an increase in risk-
taking. One promising avenue, however, is increased
emphasis on deferred payments.
RF: How important do you think independence from
the political branches is for the conduct of sound mone-
tary policy by the Fed? And if you think it is desirable,
are you concerned that some of the proposals in
Congress could compromise that independence or
might they shed useful light on the Fed’s actions?
Kaufman: I think Fed independence for monetary policy is
very important. At times, to achieve favorable longer-term
outcomes in employment and price stability, temporary
short-run outcomes may be politically unpopular — say, high
interest rates or high unemployment. If politics made it 
difficult to permit these short-run outcomes, the desired
long-run results may be more difficult to achieve. Permitting
the Government Accountability Office to audit the 
activities of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
to increase transparency would lead
to second-guessing of its actions and
introduce an additional element of
uncertainty. An interesting alterna-
tive proposal suggested recently by
the Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee, which I co-chair, is to
have the FOMC speed up the
release of the transcripts of its
meetings from the current five-year
delay to three or four weeks, in line
with the release of the summary
minutes. This would achieve trans-
parency without providing a
platform for second-guessing by
another government agency. 
RF: Please tell our readers a little
about the Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee. For
instance, why was it founded, who
serves as its members, and which
issues has it been considering?
Kaufman: The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee,
which is now entering its 25th year, is a group of independ-
ent experts on the financial services industry and its
regulatory structure. The purposes of the Committee are: (a)
to identify and analyze developing trends and ongoing
events that promise to affect the efficiency and safe opera-
tion of the financial services industry; (b) to explore the
spectrum of short- and long-term implications of emerging
problems and policy changes; (c) to help develop private,
regulatory, and legislative responses to such problems that
promote efficiency and safety and further the public inter-
est; and (d) to assess and respond to proposed and actual
public policy initiatives. 
The results of the Committee’s deliberations are in-
tended to stir debate and to increase the awareness and 
sensitivity of members of the financial services industry, 
policymakers, the media, and the general public to the
importance and implications of current events and policy
initiatives affecting the efficiency and safety of the industry.
The longevity of the Committee attests to its success in
achieving its objectives. Perhaps its most lasting contribu-
tion to date is its role in developing the prompt corrective
action and least-cost (structured early intervention and 
resolution) provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. 
Members of the Committee are drawn from academic
institutions and private organizations and reflect a wide
range of views. The only common denominators of the
members are their public recognition as experts on the
industry and their preference for market solutions to prob-
lems and the minimum degree of government regulation
consistent with efficiency and safety.  RF
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